This paper analyzes prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets from the perspective of a Pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle. It presents a model in which restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during busts. This mitigates the feedback effects of deleveraging episodes, when tightening financial constraints on borrowers and collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing effects. In our model, capital controls reduce macroeconomic volatility and increase standard measures of consumer welfare.
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A number of emerging market economies have recently imposed or considered imposing controls on capital inflows in the face of fierce capital flow bonanzas.
1 For example, Brazil imposed a 2 percent levy on on foreign investments in Brazilian stocks and fixed-income securities on Oct. 24, 2009 after experiencing a 36 percent appreciation of its currency earlier during the year, and Taiwan followed suit with a similar measure in November. 2 However, while policymakers around the world are clearly concerned about the effects of volatility in capital flows, the theoretic welfare case for such intervention has been less clear. The existing literature has studied how capital flow volatility can trigger feedback cycles that work through the depreciation of the real exchange rate. See e.g. Javier Bianchi (2010) and Anton Korinek (2009 Korinek ( , 2010 ).
This paper contributes to the debate by presenting a model based on a more general mechanism that involves asset price deflation.
Model
We describe a small open economy in a one-good world with three time periods t = 0, 1, 2. The economy is populated by a continuum of atomistic identical consumers, with a mass normalized to one. The consumer issues debt in period 0 and repays it in periods 1 and 2. In period 1, his ability to roll over debt may be affected by a collateral constraint. Period 2 represents the long term. Optimism about the future may lead to a large volume of debt inflows in period 0, making the economy vulnerable to a sudden stop/credit crunch in period 1.
The utility of the representative consumer is given by
The riskless world interest rate is normalized to zero. Thus the first-best level of consumption is the same in periods 0 and 1 and is given by c * satisfying u (c * ) = 1.
Domestic income involves two components, an endowment e that is obtained in period 1 and is not pledgeable to foreign creditors, and the return y on an asset that materializes in period 2 and can be pledged as collateral on loans from foreign investors.
(We assume that the asset is not acquired by foreign investors because residents have a strong comparative disadvantage in managing it). Each domestic consumer owns one unit of the asset, and the price of the asset at time t is denoted by p t . For simplicity, we assume that the asset return y and the endowments are deterministic, except for e, which is revealed in period 1. Because of a credit constraint, low realizations of e may trigger countercyclical capital outflows or "sudden stops".
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Under these assumptions the budget constraints of a domestic consumer are given
where d t is the debt to be repaid at the beginning of period t. The interest rate is equal to zero because there is no default in equilibrium. Each consumers faces a collateral constraint of the form
where θ 1 is the quantity of domestic collateral held by the consumer at the beginning of period 1. Domestic consumers can buy or sell the asset in a perfectly competitive domestic market but in a symmetric equilibrium we must have θ 1 = 1. The micro-foundation for constraint (1) is that a consumer could walk away from his debt, following which foreign creditors could seize his asset and sell it to other consumers in the domestic market. 2 Laissez-faire equilibrium
We solve for the equilibrium going backwards. 
In equilibrium, the period-1 price of the asset is equal to its expected return times the marginal utility of period-2 consumption (1) divided by the marginal utility of period-1 consumption,
The first-order condition to the period 1 maximization problem is
where λ lf is the shadow cost of constraint (1) . If the equilibrium is unconstrained, then c 1 = c * and p 1 = y. The equilibrium is indeed unconstrained if and only if the value 4 As we show in Jeanne and Korinek (2010) , the constraint can also involve the end-of-period collateral and be written d 2 ≤ φθ 2 p 1 with φ < 1. The only thing that matters is that the collateral constraint depend on the current price of the asset, p 1 . 5 While the main steps of the derivation are reported below, some details have been omitted and can be found in a technical appendix available at request to the authors. 
If this condition is violated, the equilibrium is constrained and is characterized by
Both sides of equation (3) are increasing with c 1 . When the constrained value of c 1 reaches c * , the equilibrium is unconstrained. In figure 1 we illustrate the resulting equilibrium. Since both lines are upward-sloping in the constrained region, small shocks to liquid net worth can lead to large movements in consumption and asset prices.
The zigzag line in the figure illustrates how the economy reacts to a small change in the endowment e by −∆, as indicated by the downward shift in the dashed line:
For the original level of consumption, the borrowing constraint would be violated, hence consumption has to decline. But this reduces the asset price p 1 = y/u (c 1 ) and therefore tightens the borrowing constraint, leading to a downward spiral of declining consumption and dropping asset prices. This is the the general mechanism behind standard models of financial acceleration or debt deflation. In the unconstrained region, by contrast, a change in endowment by +∆ (as illustrated by the upper dashed line)
does not affect consumption c 1 .
We restrict our attention to the case where equation (3) is satisfied by at most one c 1 because the derivative of the r.h.s. with respect to c 1 is strictly smaller than 1,
If this condition is not satisfied there might be multiple equilibria, in which a fall in the price of the domestic asset is self-fulfilling because it depresses domestic consumption. In the unconstrained regime, capital inflows are decreasing in e as a higher endowment shock reduces the need of consumers to borrow abroad. Conversely, if the economy is credit-constrained (in the "sudden stop regime"), capital flows become procyclical, i.e., a lower endowment shock e leads to a lower value of the collateral asset, reduced borrowing from abroad.
In period 0, decentralized agents solve the maximization problem max u(c 0 ) +
, this yields the first-order condition
The left-hand-side and right-hand-side of this equation are respectively decreasing and increasing in d 1 . The equation uniquely determines the equilibrium level of d 1 under laissez-faire.
Social planner equilibrium
We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium with the allocations chosen by a constrained social planner who internalizes the asset pricing equation in the economy (2) and 6 In the following we abstract from multiplicity for the sake of simplicity.
6 realizes that changes in aggregate consumption entail changes in asset prices, which in turn affect the borrowing constraint. In period 1, the social planner chooses the same allocation as under laissez-faire. The social planner sets d 1 in period 0 to maximize expected welfare u(c 0 ) + E 0 V sp (e − d 1 ) where the planner's measure of period-1 welfare is given by
where p(m 1 ) = y/u (c 1 ), and λ sp denotes the shadow price on the credit constraint for the social planner. The first-order condition with respect to d 2 remains u (c 1 ) = 1+λ sp .
The difference with laissez-faire is that the social planner internalizes the endogeneity of the price to the aggregate level of liquid wealth, m 1 , which decentralized agents take as given. By implication the social planner recognizes that the marginal value of liquid wealth in period 1 is
In the constrained regime, the social marginal value of liquid wealth is larger than its private marginal value because it includes the impact of aggregate wealth on the price of collateral.
The planner's first-order condition with respect to first-period debt d 1 is therefore
Whenever there are states in which the borrowing constraint is binding in period 1, both the shadow price λ sp and the derivative p (m 1 ) are positive, and hence the social planner makes the economy consume less and issue less debt in period 0 than under laissez-faire (compare with (5)). This can be interpreted as a macro-(or systemic) precautionary motive: the social planner internalizes the impact of aggregate debt on the probability and severity of a sudden stop.
The optimal level of debt could be implemented in a decentralized way by a tax τ on debt inflows that is rebated in lump sum fashion. The first-order condition on d 1 under such a tax u (c 0 ) = (1 + τ )E 0 (u (c 1 )) implies that the optimal tax is given by
Illustration
We assume that utility is logarithmic (u(c) = log c) and that e is uniformly distributed The figure illustrates the extent to which the social planner insures the economy against the risk of a sudden stop. For ε 0.13, the probability of sudden stop is reduced from 10 percent under laissez-faire to 6.8 percent by the social planner with a rather moderate tax of τ 1.3 percent. 7 The optimal tax increases more than proportionately with the probability of a sudden stop because large sudden stops are costly in terms of domestic welfare. If ε = 0.3, the social planner imposes a hefty tax of 11.4 percent on debt inflows so as to reduce the probability of a sudden stop from 19 to 12 percent.
7 The social planner reduces not only the probability but also the average size of the sudden stops. The expected consumption gap conditional on a sudden stop is lowered from 6.8 percent to 4.6 percent by the tax. Investment If we introduce risky investment decisions into the model, we find similar distortions. Decentralized agents undervalue the social costs of losses in low output states, and therefore expose themselves excessively to risky projects that fail when aggregate output is low. By the same token, they undervalue insurance and invest insufficiently in counter-cyclical projects that would yield positive payoffs in states with low aggregate endowment shocks.
Bailouts Our analysis above assumed that the only intervention available to a social planner was the imposition of ex-ante taxes on borrowing. In the real world, another common policy instrument is bailouts that aim to loosen binding constraints by directly 9 transferring resources to constrained agents. In our setup above, a one dollar transfer to constrained agents would relax constraints and trigger positive amplification effects that lead to a total increase in consumption by 1 + p (m 1 ) = 1 + y m * = 1 m * in the log-utility example.
However, there are two important limitations to bailouts: First, a self-financing bailout, i.e. a bailout that does not involve a permanent resource transfer from outside the economy, is only possible if the planner has either accumulated resources ex ante or has a superior capacity ex post to collect repayments after the bailout.
8 Secondly, to the extent that bailouts are anticipated, they create significant moral hazard concerns,
i.e., they induce decentralized agents to increase their borrowing ex ante, making it more likely that constraints will be binding and crises will occur.
Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model of collateralized international borrowing, in which the value of collateral assets endogenously depends on the state of the economy. When financial constraints are binding in such a setup, financial amplification effects (sudden stops) arise as declining collateral values, tightening financial constraints and falling consumption mutually reinforce each other.
Such amplification effects are not internalized by individual borrowers and constitute a negative externality that provides a natural rationale for the Pigouvian taxation of international borrowing. In a sample calibration we found the optimal Pigouvian tax on foreign debt to be 1.3 percent per dollar borrowed for an economy that experiences sudden stops with 10 percent probability. A fuller characterization of the externalities stemming from financial amplification effects in an infinite-horizon DSGE framework as well as the resulting optimal Pigouvian taxes are presented in Jeanne and Korinek (2010).
8 In other words, the bailout loan will only be repaid if lending by the planner is not subject to constraint
(1).
Technical Appendix

A1. Derivation of first-order conditions
The budget constraints of a domestic consumer are given by
where θ t is the quantity of the domestic collateral asset held by the consumer at the beginning of period t and d t is the debt to be repaid at the beginning of period t. The budget constraints in the text assume θ t = 1, which is true in equilibrium. 9 However to derive the asset pricing equation (2) we need to take into account the fact that θ t could be different from 1 at the individual level.
Utility is maximized under the collateral constraint (1). In period 1, thus, the representative consumer solves the problem,
where λ lf is the shadow cost of the constraint. The first-order condition for θ 2 is u (c 1 )p 1 = y, which gives equation (2) . The first-order condition for d 2 is u (c 1 ) = 1 + λ lf .
A2. Numerical illustration: the log-utility-uniform-distribution case
If u (c) = log c, then c * = 1. Condition (4), which ensures equilibrium uniqueness, is satisfied iff y < 1.
We assume e is uniformly distributed in [ē − ε,ē + ε]. Equation (3) has a solution c 1 ≥ 0 if and only if m 1 = e − d 1 ≥ 0. Since this inequality must be satisfied for any realization of e we must have d 1 < min e = e − ε. This is true provided that
The equilibrium level of consumption is the min of c * = 1 and the constrained level of consumption given by equation (3), c 1 = m 1 + yc 1 . This implies
where m * ≡ 1 − y > 0.
Equation (2) implies that the price of collateral is given by
The calibration will be characterized in terms of three parameters: m * ,ē and ε. First, let us derive a condition that is necessary and sufficient for the economy to be constrained with some probability. If the economy is never constrained then c 1 = 1 and condition (5) We will consider calibrations such that the economy would not be constrained in the absence of uncertainty but may be constrained for sufficiently large negative shocks, that is 1 + m * <ē < 1 + m * + ε.
Let us assume ε > e − m * − 1, so that the economy is constrained in period 1 with a nonzero probability. With a uniform distribution for e, the equilibrium condition (5) can be written
This equation determines the level of debt under laissez-faire, d >ē − m * − ε: otherwise the economy is never credit constrained and the first-order condition above cannot be satisfied (the lhs is above the rhs, so that the consumer would increase its debt until the constraint becomes binding with some probability). Third, one can show that the rhs is strictly increasing with d 1 in the interval [ē − m * − ε, 1] by taking the first derivative
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Thus it follows that the rhs and lhs are equal for one unique d The fixed-point equation for d 1 can be solved numerically to find the laissez-faire equilibrium level d lf 1 given the exogenous parameters m * ,ē and ε. To derive the equations with a social planner note that
and that
It follows that the social planner first-order condition (equation (6 ) 
One would like to calibrate the model so as to obtain "reasonable values" for the probability and size of a sudden stop. We now explain how to derive the underlying One can chooseē arbitrarily subject to this condition. Section 4 of the paper presents the following numerical illustration: e = 1.3 and y = 0.8 (or m * = 0.2). Thus the constraint is binding with nonzero probability if ε > e − m * − 1 = 0.1. Figure 2 was constructed as follows. For ε between 0 and 0.3 (we use an evenly spaced grid with 50 points) we compute:
• the levels of d (7) and (8); • the probability of sudden stop under laissez-faire and the social planner, π lf and π sp , using equation (10);
• the expected consumption gaps under laissez-faire and the social planner using equation (11);
• the optimal tax on capital inflows τ using equation (9). Figure 2 shows the variation with ε of π lf , π sp and τ .
